Supreme Court Examines Whether Anti-Corruption Statute Applies to Gratuities

In Snyder v. United States, the Supreme Court will decide whether 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), which makes it a crime for state and local officials to accept bribes, criminalizes payments in recognition of actions the official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions.

Petitioner James Snyder is the former mayor of Portage, Indiana. While in office, he focused on revamping Portage’s trash collection, awarding two contracts to purchase garbage trucks to Great Lakes Peterbilt, a truck dealership. After the contracts were awarded, but while Mayor Snyder was still in office, he approached Great Lakes Peterbilt about employment as a health insurance and technology consultant. Notably, Indiana law does not forbid local officials from pursuing other employment while in office. Great Lakes Peterbilt agreed and paid Mayor Snyder $13,000 for one year of his services. After an FBI investigation, the federal government indicted him, alleging that he corruptly solicited and accepted a $13,000 reward for awarding Great Lakes Peterbilt the trash collection contracts.

Section 666(a)(1)(B) criminalizes conduct by a state and local official that “corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions… involving anything of value of $5,000 or more.”

A jury convicted Mayor Snyder of bribery under Section 666, among other laws. Snyder challenged the conviction and was granted a new trial on the bribery offense. He was convicted of the same offense during the second trial. At both trials, the government argued that the $13,000 represented a gratuity for the past action of awarding the truck contracts while Mayor Snyder maintained that the federal statute applies to bribes, not gratuities, and that the payment was for his consulting services. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding that Section 666(a)(1)(B), which does not include the terms gratuity or bribe, prohibits payments intended to “influence[]” or “reward[d]” and thus reaches bribes and gratuities.

During oral argument, Snyder’s counsel pointed out that Section 666 applies to 19 million state, local, and tribal officials and that Congress did not plausibly subject all of them to a potential 10 years in prison for accepting gifts. The Chief Justice questioned whether being given $10 for a lost pen could be deemed a reward and Snyder’s counsel responded that it was, but noted that Section 666 should be distinguished from other statutes that use the term “reward” because the other statutes don’t require quid pro quo. Justice Jackson questioned whether the similarity of Section 666 to Section 215 offered any clues as to whether Section 666 included gratuities. Justice Barrett questioned whether there had actually been any prosecutions or convictions of certain hypotheticals raised by Snyder. The government’s counsel argued that Congress intended to include both bribes and gratuities when it enacted Section 666 and noted Snyder’s inability to point to any real-life cases where the statute inappropriately targeted innocuous gift-giving. The Chief Justice questioned whether a gratuity was simply a lesser offense included in the bribery offense as defined in Section 666.

Justice Sotomayor questioned whether Congress used such broad language in the statute to encompass a gratuity within the scope of the statute. Justice Kavanaugh questioned the exact definition of “corruptly” as used in the statute. Justice Gorsuch questioned whether the $5,000 value threshold of the gift for prosecution of Section 666 was actually a safeguard given the potential to stretch the value of a gift for prosecution purposes.

This case has garnered national attention, and Dykema’s Mark Chutkow was asked by Law360 to weigh in on the potential effect of a ruling. Mark noted that there are numerous examples of times the Supreme Court has found that federal prosecutors have “stepped outside the letter of the law when pursuing certain public correction cases.” As Mark acknowledged, “[t]here’s been a clear trend, I think, when you look at the Supreme Court, in narrowing the anti-corruption statutes.”

The case was argued on April 15, 2024. A decision is expected by the end of the term. Stay tuned for Dykema’s client alert discussing the Court’s opinion.

For more information, please contact Chantel Febus, James Azadian, Christopher Sakauye, Monika Harris, A. Joseph Duffy, IV, or Puja Valera.